LatCritical Encounters with Culture, in North-South Frameworks by Malavet, Pedro A.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2003
LatCritical Encounters with Culture, in North-
South Frameworks
Pedro A. Malavet
University of Florida Levin College of Law, malavet@lae.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pedro A. Malavet, LatCritical Encounters with Culture, in North-South Frameworks, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2003), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/129
Florida Law Review
Founded 1948
Formerly
University of Florida Law Review
VOLUME 55 JANuARY 2003 NUMBER I
CLUSTER I
LATCRITICAL ENCOUNTERS WITH CULTURE, IN NORTH-
SOUTH FRAMEWORKS
Pedro A. Malavet"
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 1
II. THE CONFERENCE CONTEXTS: THE ARTICULATION
AND THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE OF LATCRIT ............. 6
A. The Opening Roundtable ............................ 6
B. Plenary Panel I Implications of Indigenous Activism .... 18
C. The TWAILINAIL Concurrent Panel .................. 24
III. CONTINUING LATCRITICAL ENCOUNTERS WITH CULTURE
IN COMPARATIVE NoRTH-SoUTH FRAMEWORKS ........... 31
IV. CONCLUSION: BIENVENIDAS/OS, AMIGAS/OS
AMERICANAS/OS .................................... 38
I. INTRODUCTION
Latina/o Critical Race Theory (LatCrit) is an academic enterprise that
owes much to prior theoretical schools,' but it is most especially and
* Associate Professor, The University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law; J.D.,
LL.M., Georgetown. I am grateful to the Levin College of Law for allowing me to use a Summer
Research Grant and part of a sabbatical to work on this project. I would like to thank Berta
EsperanzaHemindez-Truyol, Guadalupe T. Luna, Ediberto Romin, and Kevin R. Johnson for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay.
1. "LatCrit theory follows and in some ways stems from the historical experience with
Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race Theory, Critical Race Feminism and
Queer Legal Theory." Francisco Valdds, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider
Jurisprudence and Latinalo Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997). I would
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clearly a re/orientation of Critical Race Theory (CRT).2 LatCrit is outsider
jurisprudence,' often postmodem4 in style, and mostly, though not
exclusively, pursued by academics of color who seek to center the Latina/o
experience5 in the legal mainstream of the United States.6 The principal
add that Critical Legal Studies (CLS) was the heir to American Legal Realism and the unwitting
catalyst for Critical Race Theory (CRT). See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W.
Fisher, I et al. eds.. 1993); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)
(providing background of CLS); Symposium: Critical Legal Studies: Roll Over Beethoven, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (describing the movement and presenting examples of its scholarship);
Cornel West, Foreword, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT xi, xxii-xxvii (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE KEY WRITINGS]
(outlining background on initial relationship and eventual split of CLS and CRT).
2. While definitions are often dangerous, if not impossible, see Francisco Valdes, Under
Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL L. REV. 1087, 1089 n.2
(1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAzA L.J. 1, 3 n.2 (1998) (noting that defining LatCrit is difficult), I like
this one:
Critical Race Theory is the most exciting development in contemporary legal
studies. This comprehensive movement in thought and life--created primarily,
though not exclusively, by progressive intellectuals of color--compels us to
confront critically the most explosive issue in American civilization: the historical
centrality and complicity of law in upholding white supremacy (and concomitant
hierarchies of gender, class, and sexual orientation).
THE KEY WRITINGS supra note 1, at xi; see also Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence
of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994) (providing introduction to a symposium devoted
entirely and specifically to CRT).
3. See Mari J. Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323-24 (1989) (discussing how "outsider
jurisprudence" is scholarship produced by and focused on outsider perspectives, communities, and
interests, i.e., going beyond the dominant group). Other forms of outsider jurisprudence include
Asian-American Legal Theory, Critical Race Feminism, Feminist Legal Theory, and Queer Legal
Theory.
4. Although I find his treatment of postmodernism overly harsh, there are some helpful
descriptions in David West's essay, The Contribution of Continental Philosophy, in A COMPANION
TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 39 (Robert E. Goodin & Phillip Pettit eds., 1993):
Postmodernism proposes a last desperate leap from the fateful complex of
Western history. Anti-humanism, with its critique of the subject and genealogical
history, has shaken the pillars of Western political thought. Heidegger's
"dismantling" of metaphysics and Den'ida's deconstruction carry the corrosion of
critique to the fundamental conceptual foundations of modernity.
Id. at 64. West adds later in the essay: "Postmodemists seek to disrupt all forms of discourse, and
particularly forms of political discourse, which might encourage the totalitarian suppression of
diversity." Id. at 65.
5. LatCrit has and will continue to have a fundamental intellectual link to CRT, but it
represents a re/orientation of CRT to "center" outsider groups other than African Americans. The
realization of the need for a separate space for this change in focus was not an easy process. While
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products of the LatCrit enterprise, both oral and written, are mostly
associated with the annual LatCrit conferences.7 This Symposium issue
I am not suggesting that there is a monolithic CRT experience, or that the CRT workshop (the
annual meeting of Race Crits) either represented the entire field of CRT, or that it lacked the
capacity to grow, the dynamics of the workshop unfortunately appear to have generated a sense of
exclusion(s). See Valdds, Poised at the Cusp, supra note 1, at 3 n.5 (noting that the CRT workshop
in 1995 had about forty participants, only two of which were Latina/o, Trina Grillo and Frank
Valdds); Comments of Sumi K. Cho, Panel: Multiplicities and Intersectionalities: Exploring
LatCrit Diveristies: EssentialPolitics, 2 HARM. LATINO L. REV. 433,454 n.44 (1997) (condemning
the "ritualistic 'violence' against gay and lesbian race crits in recent years at the [CRT] summer
workshop"); see also Stephanie L. Phillips, Mapping lntellectual/Political Foundations and Future
Self Critical Directions: The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop with LatCrit
Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAM L. REV. 1247, 1249 n.4 (1999) (conceding, as a member of the
original workshop organizing committee, that, despite best of intentions, the workshop "replicatfed]
troubling hierarchies... in particular, the privileging of African American experience and of
heterosexuality"). See generally Phillips, supra (describing history of the CRT workshop;
explaining its "invitation only" policy, and suggesting that the workshop and LatCrit Conference
had similar memberships and intellectual goals, and that they could and should be coordinated).
6. Francisco Valdds, one of the founders of this new movement, explains:
LatCrit theory is an infant discourse that responds primarily to the long historical
presence and general sociolegal invisibility of Latinas/os in the lands now known
as the United States. As with other traditionally subordinated communities within
this country, the combination of longstanding occupancy and persistent
marginality fueled an increasing sense of frustration among contemporary
Latina/o legal scholars, some of whom already identified with Critical Race
Theory (CRT) and participated in its gatherings. Like other genres of critical legal
scholarship, LatCrit literature tends to reflect the conditions of its production as
well as the conditioning of its early and vocal adherents.
Francisco Vald6s, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: ComparativeAntisubordination Experience and
Subordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, (citations omitted), available at
http://personal.law.miamiedu/-fvaldes/latcrit/overview.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
7. Naturally, this Symposium issue is the most recent installment in LatCrit scholarly
discourse, Symposium, LatCrit VI: Latinas/os and the Americas: Centering North-South
Frameworks in LatCrit Theory, 55 FLA. L. REv. 1 (2003); but there has been a symposium issue
for each of the annual LatCrit conferences. See generally Symposium, LatCrit V: Class in LatCrit:
Theory and Praxis in a World of Economic Inequality, 78 DENy. U. L. REV. 467 (2001);
Symposium, LatCrit IV: Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers: LatCrit Theory and Marginal
Intersections, 23 U.C. DAVISL. REv. 751(2000); Symposium, LatCritill: Comparative Latinas/os:
Identity, Law andPolicy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAM L. REV. 575 (1999); Symposium, LatCrit
II: Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latinalo Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19
CHiCANO-LATINOL. REV. 1 (1998); Symposium, LatCrit 1. LatCrit Theory: Naming andLaunching
a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATtNO L. REV. 1 (1997); Colloquium,
LatCrit: Representing Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J.
I (1996); Colloquium, International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 177 (1996); see also Joint Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Latinas/os and the Law, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998) (noting that this was a "stand-
alone" symposium, not directly connected to one of the LatCrit conferences).
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partly memorializes the Sixth Annual LatCrit Conference, which
represented an important milestone because it reached out and empowered
the voices of the Southern part of our hemisphere.' The essays in the
cluster addressed in this Essay are the product of this cooperative process
of giving voice to the native9 scholars from the Southern Americas, while
seeking to expand our voice within the North American academy.
The initial challenge in writing this cluster introduction was to
articulate the thread of unity in the themes covered by the authors and the
8. The Substantive Program Outline described it as follows:
Saludos! This year, the LatCrit Annual Conference will take the long
foreshadowed step of affirmatively and self-consciously exploring the links that
bind Latina/o Communities in the United States to their homeland societies,
cultures and economies and how the impact of such globalization informs an
articulation of LatCrit theory and discourse. As many LatCritters have repeatedly
commented, the articulation of an inclusive vision of intra-and intergroup justice
has for too long been paralyzed by the conflation of citizenship and geography in
popular discourse and legal theory. These links help t9 explain why Latinas/os in
the United States constitute transnational groups and communities, typically
retaining strong material connections to, and cultural identifications with, their
homelands' traditions, issues, concerns, hopes and aspirations. These links, while
oftentimes noted in prior LatCrit programs and texts, have yet to be explicitly
thematized and explored in a programmatic way; this year, we take up this
pending challenge collectively.
The LatCrit VI planning committee has made an affirmative effort to structure
the program to center specifically inter-American approaches to social and legal
issues. Our hope is to undertake some comparative critical studies of "domestic"
issues and their counterparts throughout the Americas, using one or more of the
following five lenses or categories which have been employed in prior years'
conference themes: (i) Latina/o pan-ethnicity and multiracialism, including intra-
Latina/o issues of sameness and difference as well as non-Hispanic Latinas/os,
including mestizaje, Indianess and blackness in Latina/o communities and
societies; (2) identity-religion, culture, gender, sexuality and heteropatriarchy;
(3) immigrations, migrations, and citizenships; (4) coalition, democracy, and
community; (5) class and economic equity, including trade, labor, and
environment. The basic concept is to encourage critical inquiry of these five broad
areas in ways that illuminate and elucidate the North-South character of Latina/o
transnationality. Underscoring the inter/national nature of LatCrit theory to date,
this year's conference planners generally hope to turn the gains and insights of the
past five years toward a better collective understanding of the diverse hemisphere
we share: the Americas.
Sixth Annual LatCrit Conference, Substantive Program Outline, at http://personal.law.miami.edu/
-fvaldes/latcrit/lcvidocs/cvisubstantiveprogram.html (visited June 6, 2002) [hereinafter
Substantive Program Outline).
9. "Native" is used here to refer to people who are autochthonous to the Americas, not as
a reference to Native American, "Indian," or indigenous identity. See also infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
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panels in which they initially presented their ideas during the Sixth Annual
LatCrit Conference. After all, they were located in different geographic
and, seemingly, different intellectual sites within the conference.'0 But this
cluster of essays, individually and collectively, effectively captures the
overall theme of LatCrit VI: Latinas/os and the Americas: Centering
North-South Frameworks in LatCrit Theory." Specifically, every one of
the essays in this section focuses on Latin American legal systems and
cultures." The methodology may be theoretical or practical, philosophical
or sociological, legal or interdisciplinary, but all these works address the
challenges posed by the legal systems and cultures that co-exist within the
nations of Latin America in 21st century academic legal discourse.
This Essay will first discuss how the essays fit within or challenge the
themes of the specific roundtable, plenary, or workshop in which they
were presented. It will then locate the cluster within the present and the
future of LatCrit Theory generally, and LatCritical praxis3 in particular.
10. Hugo Rojas and Mauricio Garcia-Villegas participated in the Opening Roundtable:
Encountering Latin America: Exploring the Parameters and Encountering Latin America:
Exploring the Parameters and Relevance of LatCrit Theory In and Through a Regional Rotation.
Susan Scafidi participated in Plenary Panel One: Implications of Indigenous Activism. Jorge
Esquirol and Michael Wallace Gordon participated in the third concurrent panel, titled
TWAIL/NAIL: Latin American Legal Theory.
1I. See Substantive Program Outline, supra note 8.
12. "Culture" is used here to describe complex social constructs. The negative forms of
culture include the essentialized development of dominant ones, and the imposition of negative
stereotypes by the dominant culture on social outsiders. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying
text. The positive forms of culture include communitarian, empowering self constructs. See infra
notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
13. "LatCritical" describes the LatCrit approach to legal theory. Francisco Valdds has written
about praxis in the LatCrit enterprise:
Following from the recognition that all legal scholarship is political is that LatCrit
scholars must conceive of ourselves as activists both within and outside our
institutions and professions. Time and again, the authors urge that praxis must be
integral to LatCrit projects because it ensures both the grounding and potency of
the theory. Praxis provides a framework for organizing our professional time,
energy and activities in holistic ways. Praxis, in short, can help cohere our roles
as teachers, scholars and activists. The proactive embrace of praxis as organic in
all areas of our professional lives thus emerges as elemental to the initial
conception of LatCrit theory. Praxis therefore serves as the second LatCrit
guidepost.
Valdds, supra note 1, at 53.
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II. THE CONFERENCE CONTEXTS: THE ARTICULATION AND
THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE OF LATCRIT
This part of the Essay will address each presentation, the specific
conference context(s) in which it was delivered, and how the essays
produced by the presenters develop these ideas.
A. The Opening Roundtable
Hugo Rojas and Mauricio Garcia-Villegas participated in our opening
roundtable discussion: Encountering Latin America: Exploring the
Parameters and Relevance of LatCrit Theory In and Through a Regional
Rotation. 4
14. This was described in the Substantive Program Outline as follows:
The focus of this opening discussion marks a new trajectory for the LatCrit
practice of rotating centers, by challenging inherited categories that would
otherwise map the world's regions in racial terms. In this inherited framework, the
world is divided into racialized regions: Latin America is Hispanic, Africa is
Black, Europe and North America are White, and Asia is (no surprise) Asian. By
centering Latin America in LatCrit theory, this kick-off discussion seeks to
challenge these essentialist constructions. Latin America, like the United States,
and indeed, all regions of the world, is multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural,
and multiracial. It is inhabited by individuals and groups marked by differences
of gender, class, national origin, sexual orientation, and religion, as well as by the
historical articulations of white supremacy, colonialism, and the expansion of
international capitalist processes and social formations.
Against this background, the opening plenary explores how focusing LatCrit
antiessentialist, antisubordination perspectives on the particularities of Latin
American realities might inspire new theoretical insights and enable new
coalitional possibilities among subordinated groups, both within Latin America
and across other regions. How, for example, do questions of group identity and the
role of law in the production of inter-group justice map across the realities of
ongoing civil war, politicized military institutions, dictatorial cultural traditions,
an interconnected church and state, resurgent indigenous nations, imported
jurisprudence and civil law systems? How are these realities reflected in the
structure and substance of Latin American legal institutions and norms and, with
what implications for the process of social transformation? Put differently, what
does LatCrit theory have to offer Latin American legal scholars and social
activists, and conversely what do they offer LatCrit theory?
This opening plenary seeks to engage these important questions by convoking
a diverse group of legal scholars, educators, and social scientists from Colombia,
Cuba, Mexico and the United States to share their critical perspectives on the
realities confronting Latin America and their relevance to Latinas/os and other
outsider groups within the United States.
Substantive Program Outline, supra note 8.
[Vol. 55
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Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, a Colombian-born and trained academic,
engages LatCrit in a critique of what he describes as the Legal
Consciousness Studies Movement," a subset of Law and Society. 6
Professor Garcia-Villegas uses a linguistic style and structure that to the
United States observer might appear to be related to university disciplines
other than law. However, his writing must be contextualized in the
Colombian system of legal education, which is more analogous to our
undergraduate system of college education in methodology, if not
necessarily in content. Moreover, Colombia, like most Civil Law systems,
approaches legal education as a more interdisciplinary endeavor than the
traditional United States law school curriculum. 7
Professor Garcia-Villegas aims high, and thus purposely chooses
language that might be inaccessible in any other context. Reaching the
proper balance between the critical exploration of language and its
abuse-its use in hurtful and negative ways-is often a challenge, and
critical race scholars have often been accused of language abuse. 8 While
the attacks on CRT all too often are essentialist 9 attempts to silence
15. He explains that
[s]tudies of legal consciousness bring together, with variants, essential parts of
both the "Law and Society" and the critical traditions. From Law & Society they
have taken the idea that empirical research is essential to make sense of the way
that law functions in the society. From the critical tradition they have adopted the
aspiration that sociolegal studies should serve not only to describe how law
operates in society but also and above all to contribute to the transformation of
society and the defense of the excluded.
Mauricio Garcfa-Villegas, Symbolic Power Without Symbolic Violence?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 157
(2003).
16. The "Law and Society Association, founded in 1964, is a group of scholars from many
fields and countries, interested in the place of law in social, political, economic and cultural life."
The Law and Society home page, at http://www.lawandsociety.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2002). For
a critical analysis of the Law and Society Movement, see Trubek, infra note 82.
17. See generally Richard J. Wilson, The New Legal Education in North and South America,
25 STAN. J. INT'L LAW 375 (1989) (containing a dated but still largely accurate description of legal
education in South American countries, including Colombia); THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE,
LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 841-91 (John Henry Merryman et al. eds., 1994) (providing a brief
introduction to legal education in the civil law world generally) [hereinafter CIVIL LAW
TRADITION].
18. Compare Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional
"Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997), with Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Legal Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption, 77 TEX. L. REv. 321
(1998).
19. "Essentialism adopts the view that all members of a group are alike and share a common
'essence."' Cho, supra note 5, at 433 n.l. As it is used herein:
The concept of essentialism suggests that there is one legitimate, genuine
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different voices,2" the intentional misuse of language simply for the sake
of showing off or of being exclusionary can be hegemonic2" and, more
simply, ineffective.22 But, in the LatCrit context, deconstructionist
postmodem analysis, such as that undertaken by Garcia-Villegas, clearly
demands a careful approach to language which allows scholars properly
to explore the hidden complexities of its subjects.23 The LatCrit use of
universal voice that speaks for all members of a group, thus assuming a
monolithic experience for all within the particular group---be it women, blacks,
latinas/os, Asians, etc. Feminists of color have been at the forefront of rejecting
essentialist approaches because they effect erasures of the multidimensional nature
of identities and also collapse multiple differences into a singular homogenized
experience.
Berta Esperanza Hemindez-Truyol, Constructing LatCrit Theory: Diversity, Commonality, and
Identity: LatIndia ll-Latinas/os, Natives, And Mestizajes--A LatCrit Navigation of Nuevos
Mundos, Nuevas Fronteras and Nuevas Teorlas, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 851, 862 n.26 (2000)
(citations omitted); see also FEMINISTLEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 335 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed.,
1993) (discussing gender essentialism); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588 (1990) (discussing gender and racial essentialism).
20. See Pedro A. Malavet, Performing LatCrit: Literature and the Arts as Antisubordination
Praxis: LatCrit Theory and Cultural Production: The Confessions of an Accidental Crit, 33 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1293, 1297-1306 (2000) (discussing the debate over the use of narrative in legal
scholarship).
21. For example, abuse of language can be nothing more than a self-indulgent attempt to
develop a secret speech that sets your little clique apart, both in private and in public. In her critique
of the excesses of literary criticism, Barbara Christian explains the real dangers of such language
abuse:
For I feel that the new emphasis on literary critical theory is as hegemonic as the
world which it attacks. I see the language it creates as one which mystifies rather
than clarifies our condition, making it possible for a few people who know that
particular language to control the critical scene-that language surfaced,
interestingly enough, just when the literature of peoples of color, of black women,
of Latin Americans, of Africans began to move to "the center."
Barbara Christian, The Race for the Theory, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL: HACIENDO CARAS:
CREATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY FEMINISTS OF COLOR 335, 338 (Gloria Anzaldia ed.,
1990).
22. Here I refer to the forced use of overly complicated language simply for the sake of
making an exaggerated pseudo-intellectual display, rather than to write effective scholarship.
Barbara Christian again articulates the problem well: "And as a student of literature, I am appalled
by the sheer ugliness of the language, its lack of clarity, its unnecessarily complicated sentence
constructions, its lack of pleasurableness, its alienating quality. It is the kind of writing for which
composition teachers would give a freshman a resounding F." Id. at 339.
23. For example, LatCrit scholarship challenges the traditional civil rights discourse in law
by thoroughly exploring the weaknesses of the Black/White binary paradigm of race. See Ian F.
Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1143 (1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57 (1998); Juan F. Perca, The BlackWhite Binary
Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213
[Vol. 55
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language in legal scholarship is thus exciting, intellectually stimulating,
and effective.2
Garcia-Villegas acknowledges that his work is abstract to a level that
his "critique is not suitable to -all authors interested in legal
consciousness."25 However, in typical LatCrit form, Garcia-Villegas
introduces a provocative theoretical paradigm that will enrich LatCrit
Theory. Using the language of postmodernism, Professor Garcia-Villigas
explains how the Legal Consciousness Movement fails to adequately
account for the effects of structural power hegemonies within a particular
legal culture, thus undermining its practical effectiveness as a viable
theoretical school. Legal Consciousness Theory might be described as
Legal Realism from a different frame of reference: that of the client or
party, rather than that of the judge or attorney. The "client," moreover, is
usually a marginalized person, an "other."26
(1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127 (1998) [hereinafter Perea, The Black/White Binary
Paradigm of Race]; Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White
Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571 (1995). This challenge to the binary can be
traced back to the very first LatCrit colloquium in Puerto Rico. See generally Colloquium,
Representing Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996);
see also Robert S. Chang. The Nativist's Dream of Return, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 55 (1996) (stating that
Asian-Americans do not fit within the "comfortable binary" of the Black/White paradigm of race);
Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 61 (1997) (finding that
Latinas/os are not adequately represented in American civil rights debate because they do not fit
within the paradigm); Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review
of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1186, 1188 (1985) (book review) (explaining that
"foreignness" and the construction/imposition thereof establishes many U.S. citizens, especially
Asian-Americans and Latinas/os, as a permanent underclass); Deborah Ramirez, ForgingA Latino
Identity, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 61, 63 (1996) (explaining a personal experience that required her to
challenge the paradigm in order to properly assist a local Latina/o community); Francisco Valdds,
Latinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, andPost-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture:
From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 20-24 (1996) (discussing various authors'
challenges to the Black/White binary).
24. Of course, a demanding use of language is essential to critical scholarship. More
* generally, mastering language is an essential skill for a lawyer or academic, and challenging the
language skills of any audience can have strong pedagogical effects. But teachers and scholars
should be offended by the notion that simple language is a sign of simple-mindedness. For example,
popular cultural narratives may sometimes be spoken in plain and simple language and are still
perfectly able to transmit complex ideas that constitute antisubordination praxis. (I do not mean to
imply that popular culture is always "plain and simple" in language. In fact, popular culture is
incredibly complex and textured. However, on occasion, the popular artist uses plain and simple
language to make very complex messages accessible to everyone in their community.)
Additionally, the capacity to present complex concepts in language that make them accessible to
students and to persons outside our field takes a great deal of talent. Moreover, making our work
accessible to uninitiated audiences is part of our educational mission and is essential to LatCrit
praxis.
25. Garcia-Villegas, supra note 15, at 159.
26. In general, as used herein, "other" and being "othered" mean to be socially constructed
HeinOnline  -- 55 Fla. L. Rev.  9 2003
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Garcia-Villegas provides an important warning about shifting the focus
of law too much towards the micro-level, and about the methodology of
symbolism. He explains that "the absence of a macrosociological lens
lessens the capacity to 'see' and analyze genuinely efficacious
emancipatory options for the excluded." '" This, Garcia-Villegas explains,
is the result of practical contradictions created by attempts within the
Legal Consciousness Movement to maintain theoretical coherence in its
use of the symbolic. This "exigency of theoretical coherence,"28 prevents
the Legal Consciousness theorists from leading us into effective legal
reform. The solution, Garcfa-Villegas suggests, is to develop a proper
balance between the "micro/macro terrain" presented by any complex
functioning society and nation. The symbolic theoretical vision of any
critical theory that aspires to effective praxis must also be able to produce
"a theory of the symbolic strategy as a political instrument, whether it be
of domination or of social emancipation."29 Garcia-Villegas' work fits
within previous comparative legal discourse about the differences between
hortatory (exhortative) and prescriptive (compulsory or coercive) legal
systems.30 Additionally, Critical Race theorists long ago identified the
tension, and sometimes the disjunction, between theory and praxis."
as "not normative." See, e.g.. Cathy J. Cohen, Straight Gay Politics: The Limits ofan Ethnic Model
ofInclusion, in ETHNICrrY AND GROUP RIGHTS 572, 580 (Will Kymlicka& [an Shapiro eds., 1997).
Much of the material exclusion experienced by marginal groups is based on, or
justified by, ideological processes that define these groups as "other." Thus,
marginalization occurs, in part, when some observable characteristic or
distinguishing behavior shared by a group of individuals is systematically used
within the larger society to signal the inferior and subordinate status of the group.
Id. (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENTOF SPOILEDIDENTITY (1963)).
However, I will also use the term "other" as a relative term. See infra note 11 and accompanying
text.
27. Garcla-Villegas, supra note 15, at 187.
28. Id. at 188-89.
29. Id. at 189.
30. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 5-8 (1987)
(indicating that classical Greek vision in which "the aim of law is to lead the citizens toward virtue,
to make them noble and wise," comparing it to the U.S. and England where laws take the forms of
"prescriptions" intended to rule actual conduct rather than to persuade and educate subjects into
compliance therewith).
31. See Harris, supra note 2, at 751 (noting that there is a tension between the
deconstructionist theoretical bent ofCRT that attacks entrenched power hegemonies, and the design
of an affirmative program of racial "emancipation" which she labels "reconstruction"); Harlon L.
Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435,436-37 (1987) (discussing the split
between CLS practitioners and theorists); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical
Race Theory andPostmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57,69-70
(1995) (arguing postmoder theory cannot produce a reform project); Patricia J. Williams,
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Accordingly, LatCrit Theory has always tried to ensure that its theoretical
work is capable of contributing to praxis.32 Therefore, Garcia-Villegas'
work fits within the LatCrit enterprise, which seeks to empower the
marginalized through effective praxis, while maintaining a coherent
theoretical paradigm.
Hugo Rojas challenges the traditional construct of Chilean society as
representing a single mixed race and a homogeneous national culture.33
LatCrit has studied a similar racialized demand for assimilation into a
normative,34 homogeneous White culture in the United States.35 LatCrit
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
401, 404-06 (1987) (noting CLS' rejection of rights makes reform difficult).
32. As discussed above, praxis is one of the essential guideposts of LatCrit Theory. See
Vald6s, supra note I and accompanying text; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Critical Race
Feminism and International Human Rights, 28 U. MiAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 337, 341 (1996)
("[W]hile [Critical Race Feminism] is concerned with theoretical frameworks, it is very much
centered on praxis and attempts to identify ways to empower women through law and other
disciplines.").
33. Hugo Rojas, Stop Cultural Exclusions (in Chile)!: Reflections on the Principle of
Multiculturalism, 55 FLA. L. REV. 121 (2003).
34. Normative means the dominant societal paradigm, that is, what is considered "normal"
in a given sociological context. See Berta Esperanza Hemindez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered:
Normativities, Latinas and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 891 (1997) (noting that
"knowledge is socially constructed," therefore, the "normative paradigm's dominance" defines
"normal").
35. In the United States there is a legal and social mythology of two racial groups, Blacks and
Whites, which LatCrit has labeled the "Black/White binary paradigm of race." See supra note 23.
Within the binary, Whiteness, and the privilege associated with it, implies full assimilation into the
U.S. body politic, and Blackness implies exclusion from the normative society. Moran, supra note
23, at 69 (arguing "Latinos receive the message that they are supposed to adapt to American life
as earlier generations of White ethnic immigrants did, [or] instead they will remain an isolated and
unassimilable population like Blacks"). In addition to fighting against the White supremacist nature
of the paradigm, LatCrit scholarship has studied and debated why Latinas/os are denied full
citizenship, despite our legal classification as Whitm See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, supra note 23
(examining U.S. legal and social racial categorizing, concluding that Latinas/os are legally
classified as White, but socially racialized as"other"); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Retaining Race: LatCrit
Theory andMexican American Identity in Hemandez v. Texas, 2 HARv. LATiNo L. REV. 279 (1997)
[hereinafter Lopez, Retaining Race] (responding to Professor Perea, arguing that Latinas/os are
denied full citizenship despite legal Whiteness because they are socially constructed as belonging
to an inferior non-White race); George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-
Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 321, 326-29 (1997) (noting that U.S. courts
recognized Mexicans as White for purposes of the naturalization laws-which only allowed Whites
to become U.S. citizens; census also classified Mexican Americans as White); Juan Perea, Five
Axioms in Search of Equality, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 231 (1997) (arguing that Latinas/os are
excluded from full citizenship because of "ethnicity") [hereinafter Perea, Five Axioms]; Perea, The
Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race, supra note 23 (arguing that Latinas/os are "racialized,"
leading to our marginalization). See also Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire "?:
Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997), reprinted in 10
LA RAZA L.J. 173 (1998) (positing that the U.S. myth of assimilation acts as a "ring of fire" that
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seeks to empower the "other" within all societies and challenges the
notions of an assimilationist culture that imposes a homogenized
normativity. Rojas does just that in the very specific Chilean context by
explaining the need for multicultural citizenship generally. But he is
specially concerned with the marginalization of indigenous peoples within
Chilean culture, and the accompanying deprivation of political rights
under the Chilean Constitution.36 Rojas once again brings into LatCrit
focus the distinction between imposed racialized 37 constructs of cultural
citizenship3" and legal/political citizenship.39
must bum away "non-U.S." cultural identity, and resistance thereto makes Latinas/os
unassimilable); Rachael E. Moran, What IfLatinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate?,
85 CAL. L. REV. 1315, 1344 (1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 229 (1998) ("Latinos are forcing
America to revisit conventional wisdom about immigration and civil rights by reconsidering
popular assumptions about citizenship and identity as well as processes of assimilation and
pluralism.").
36. In the United States, critical theorists, including LatCritters, have written about the need
for a multicultural, constitutional definition of citizenship. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of
America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100
YALE L.J. 1329, 1401-03 (1991) (taking the position that "radical pluralism," entitlement to cultural
independence, is constitutionally justified, and perhaps even required by the U.S. Constitution);
Enid Trucios-Haynes, The Role of Transnational Identity and Migration, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 293 (1996) (arguing that "transnational identity" leads to "transnational multiculturalism"
within the U.S. borderlands, which deserves legal recognition and protection). See also Kenneth
L. Karst, Citizenship, Race and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst,
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986); Gerald
Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1988).
37. LatCrit scholarship has noted that the social and legal construction of Latinas/os in the
United States is fundamentally a racialized process. For example, Ian F. Haney Lopez explains that
while race and ethnicity are not
essentially different; on the contrary. .. race and ethnicity are largely the same.
[But they] should not be conflated because these two forms of identity have been
deployed in fundamentally different ways. The attribution of a distinct ethnic
identity has often served to indicate cultural distance from Anglo-Saxon norms.
Left unstated but implicit, however, is a claim of transcendental, biological
similarity: ethnics and Anglo-Saxons are both White. The attribution of a distinct
racial identity, on the other hand, has served to indicate distance not only from
Anglo-Saxon norms, but also from Whiteness. Racial minorities are thus twice
removed from normalcy, across a gap that is not only cultural, but supposedly
innate.
L6pez, Retaining Race, supra note 35, at 283 (footnotes omitted).
38. LatCrit scholars have paid special attention to the social construction of "foreignness,"
with its inherent denial of "citizenship," that is often imposed on Latinas/os and other groups-such
as Asian-Americans--in the United States, despite our legal citizenship. See Neil Gotanda, Asian-
American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME
COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1096 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992).
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Rojas identifies independence, secession, and regional autonomy, while
remaining within a single federal government, as alternatives to empower
indigenous peoples.' These are certainly sensible choices when a
[In] the United States, if a person is racially identified as African American or
white, that person is presumed to be legally a U.S. citizen and socially an
American.
... [But] these presumptions are not present for Asian Americans, Latinos,
Arab Americans, and other non-Black racial minorities. Rather, there is the
opposite presumption that these people are foreigners; or, if they are U.S. citizens,
then their racial identity includes a foreign component.
Id.; see also Juan Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making oflnvisible People, 70N.Y.U. L. REV. 965,
966 (stating "Latino invisibility" is defined as "relative lack of positive public identity and
legitimacy" caused by our foreign ethnicity). Language has also been an important theme in LatCrit
scholarship. See. e.g., Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship
Between Language Law Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L.
REv. 145, 146 (1997) (discussing "language vigilantism," how "individuals speaking a language
other than English [mostly Latinas/os] have increasingly come under attack [from normative
Anglos] in their schools, their workplaces, and even in their homes and places of leisure"); Juan
F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and
Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 350-73 (1992) (analyzing "official English" legal
proposals);.
39. The distinction and disjunction between cultural and political citizenship has been a
strong theme in CRT generally and LatCrit Theory in particular. See, e.g., Guadalupe T. Luna,
Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a "Naked Knife," 4 MIcH.
J. RACE & L. 39 (1998) (detailing how Mexican-Americans in the Southwest had their land taken
away in spite of their legal citizenship--and their property rights); Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico:
Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2000) (describing Puerto Ricans as an
identifiable culture that lacks a legal citizenship, and how they are deprived of real political power
because of their legally second-class U.S. citizenship); Robert Westley. Many Billions Gone: Is it
Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 429 (1998) (advocating
reparations to bring African-Americans to full political citizenship in the U.S.); Eric K. Yamamoto,
Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV.
477 (1998) (containing a critical review of reparations for the internment of U.S. citizens of
Japanese descent during the Second World War).
The alien represents a body of rules passed by Congress and reinforced by popular
culture. It is society, often through the law, which defines who is an alien, an
institutionalized "other," and who is not. It is society through Congress and the
courts that determines which rights to afford aliens.
Kevin R. Johnson, The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 263, 268 (1996). See generally Symposium, Citizenship and its Discontents: Centering the
Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 76 OR. L. REv. 207 (1997); Ibrahim J. Gassama et al.,
Foreword, 76 OR. L. REv. 207, 209 (1997) ("The papers in this Symposium investigate the
aporectic relations among the nation-state, liberal understandings of citizenship, and problematic
constructions of race and ethnicity as they are applied to immigrants.").
40. Every one of these alternatives falls under the rubric of autonomous regimes under
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combination of an identifiable indigenous group and a definable territory
can be found.4' However, it is not a general solution to the problems of a
multicultural modem state in which co-existence within the same territory
is a practical necessity. Such a factual situation requires a different
theoretical paradigm.42
Rojas' deployment of the work of Will Kymlicka must be viewed with
some care. Kymlicka is a staunch defender of liberalism, and in fact favors
the "toleration" model of the liberal state as a solution to the challenges of
multiculturalism.43 This is a result of Kymlicka's stance as a modem
International Law. See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, Considering "Third Generation"
International Human Rights Law in the United States, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 387 (1996)
(arguing that international human rights, such as the right to self-determination, can help to inform
LatCrit Theory and to implement its praxis).
41. "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Annex Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/63 16 art. I § I (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 art. I § 1 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
42. Adeno Addis explains:
As a general response to diversity in political units, however, separation seems as
impractical as it is dangerous. It is impractical partly because not all groups that
believe themselves to be marginalized and excluded from the social and political
life of the polity live in a defined territorial unit. In such circumstances, secession
will not be a viable answer to the problem of exclusion and discrimination.
Indeed, the notion of separation under these conditions is likely to lead to a
process of ethnic cleansing. It is also true that not all groups that have grievances
against a dominant majority want to secede, even if that were practically possible.
They simply wish to participate equally and fully in the life of the political
community.
Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS
112, 113 (Will Kymlicka & Ian Shapiro eds.,1997) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter ETHNICITY].
43. Kymlicka presents important objections to the multicultural/communitarian critiques of
liberal theory that challenge the critics to prove the shortcomings of liberalism or to admit that they
are using liberal theory to construct a new paradigm for a more complicated world. Kymlicka, for
example, would argue that recognition of community and culture is a process of the evolution of
liberalism, rather than a competing paradigm that requires the rejection of liberalism. See WILL
KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989). "Considering the nature and value
of cultural membership not only takes us down into the deepest reaches of a liberal theory of the
self, but also outward to some of the most pressing questions ofjustice and injustice in the modem
world." Id. at 258; see also MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 111-12 (1997).
The centrifugal forces of culture and selfhood will correct one another only if the
correction is planned .... [T]he political creed that defends the framework,
supports the necessary forms of state action, and so sustains the modem regimes
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liberal." However, it is important to emphasize that liberalism is not an
inherently progressive political theory,"' it requires a multicultural lens to
produce a form of citizenship that truly empowers cultural minorities.'
Rojas then properly uses the work of Jtlrguen Habermas, providing a
coherent political theory that applies to resolve the problems of minority
groups within the multicultural state.47 Habermas argues that it is possible
to respect multiculturalism in a modem democratic society. Individual and
group cultural differences can exist, and the State can thrive, if the citizens
exercise what he calls "constitutional patriotism." Under constitutional
patriotism, individuals are free to develop their own personal or group
culture4 as long as they share legal/political citizenship and a common
of toleration-is social democracy. If multiculturalism today brings more trouble
than hope, it does so in part because of the weakness of social democracy (in this
country, left liberalism). But that is another, longer story.
Id.
44. In his works, Kymlicka maps himself as a modem liberal scholar, a la Ronald Dworkin.
KYMLICKA, supra note 43, at 10 ("[H]op[ing] to show how my Kymlicka's arguments are related
to the political morality of modem liberals from J.S. Mill through to Rawis and Dworkin"). See also
RONALD DWOR1IN, LAWS EMPIRE (1989); RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIOHTS SERIousLY (1986).
45. "[Liberalism] is not always a progressive doctrine, for many classical liberals are
skeptical about the average human being's ability to make useful advances in morality and culture,
for instance." Alan Ryan, Liberalism, in A COMPANION TO CONTMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 293 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1993).
46. See generally Malavet, supra note 39, at 75-96 (describing the failure of liberal
citizenship as a model that truly empowers minorities within the multicultural state, and articulating
a reformed liberalism with a multicultural sensibility).
47. See Jflrgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future
of Europe, in THEORIZING CTZENSHIP 255 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
One's own national tradition will... have to be appropriated in such a manner
that it is related to and relativized by the vantage points of the other national
cultures. It must be connected with the overlapping consensus of a common,
supranationally shared political culture .... Particularist anchoring of this sort
would in no way impair the universalist meaning of popular sovereignty and
human rights.
Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
48. "Culture" as used by Habermas does not mean the stereotypes that are often used by the
normative society to discriminate against certain groups discussed above. Rather, Habermas refers
to positive cultural self-constructs. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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political culture.49 Rojas will surely apply this type of scholarship in
further development of his own work.
Accordingly, Rojas will benefit from the sophisticated critiques of
liberalism and exposition of postmodern alternatives thereto that are
common in LatCrit scholarship."0 Conversely, LatCrit will benefit from his
development of these theoretical foundations, and from his discussion of
the specific context of Chilean society, a matter that he begins in his essay,
and which we can only hope he continues to develop within the LatCrit
enterprise.
Both Garcia-Villegas and Rojas engaged the conference in precisely
the type of discussion that the opening roundtable, the overall conference,
and LatCrit jurisprudence intended to foster. They both "centered" their
nations to our South (Colombia and Chile respectively) in LatCrit
discourse. Moreover, both Garcia-Villegas and Rojas challenged
theoretical and social constructs of Latin American nations and their
citizens as constituting a single, mixed, Latina/o "race."
One might argue that the construct of Latina/o as a racial category
encompassing people of White, indigenous, and African heritage, misses
the point that Latinas/os are not a race; rather, we are a cultural/ethnic
group encompassing persons of many different races. To put it more
simply, phenotypically or anthropologically, some Latinas/os are White,
Black, Indigenous, Asian, Arab, something else, or of mixed heritage. On
the other hand, many Latinas/os embrace the concept of a "sociedado raza
india, espahola y africana" (an Indian, Spanish, and African society or
49. See Habermas, supra note 47.
[E]xamples of multicultural societies like... the United States demonstrate that
a political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted by
no means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same language or the same
ethnic and cultural origins. Rather, the political culture must serve as the common
denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an
awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life whIch
coexist in a multicultural society.
Id. at 264.
50. See generally Jean Stefancic, Latino and Latina Critical Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1509 (1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L. J. 423 (1998) (critiquing
liberalism is one of the basic themes of LatCrit Theory). See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco,
Intersections Between LatCrit Theory and Law and Development Studies, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 313 (1996) (critiquing neo-liberal development theory); Berta Esperanza Hernfindez-Truyol
& Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Foreword: Culture, Nationhood, and the Human Rights Ideal, 33 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 233, 246-51 (2000) (critiquing liberalism using international legal principles);
Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449
(1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L. J. 363 (1998) (using critical theory to deconstruct the liberal
myth of an incompatible merit/bias binary).
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race). 5' But, of course, these shifting constructions ofLatinidad (Latina/o-
ness) only help to reinforce the LatCrit tenet that race is a social
construct, 2 and as such varies according to lens." The racialization of
Latinas/os as a single-non-White race produces our marginalization within
the United States borderlands. However, in the nations of Latin America
the "single-mixed-race" construct enforces White Supremacy by denying
the existence of socially constructed racial differences and enforced racial
privilege(s). As Hugo Rojas points out, this reduces racial minorities, such
as indigenous peoples, to invisibility, and thus leaves them powerless
within the legal/political system. Garcia-Villegas underscores the concept
that critical theorists can only empower the diverse members of their
societies by focusing both on the individual and on his/her
legal/political/social location within the nation as a whole.
These two essays balance each other quite well. Garcia-Villegas wants
to empower the marginalized "other," but warns that this can best be
accomplished within the national social and legal structure. Rojas begins
to explore how liberalism, with a multicultural sensitivity, might provide
true constitutional citizenship for Chilean indigenous peoples. Both
authors fully capture the anti-essentialist nature of LatCrit Theory. In
particular, Garcia-Villegas focuses "LatCrit antiessentialist,
antisubordination perspectives on the particularities of Latin American
realities [that] might inspire new theoretical insights and enable new
coalitional possibilities among subordinated groups, both within Latin
America and across other regions."' 4 This is precisely what the panel was
intended to bring to the forefront of our conference. Rojas, likewise
51. This is a common image in Latin-American popular culture. See, e.g., LA SONORA
PONCERIA, DESCENDENCIA, BIRTHDAY PARTY ("Somos latinos, somas la esencia de Puerto Rico,
quien me discute ese honor... Orgulloso de mi cantar, latina, yo siempre estoy,. . . Mezcla de
espahol, africano y taino." (emphasis added). Author's translation: "We are Latinos, we are the
essence of Puerto Rico, who argues/challenges this honor?... Proud of my singing, Latin, I always
am,.. . A Mixture of Spaniard, African, and Taino.").
52. "Race is social, in the sense that the groups commonly recognized as racially distinct
have their genesis in cultural practices of differentiation rather than in genetics, which plays no role
in racial fabrication other than contributing the morphological differences onto which the myths
of racial identity are inscribed." Lopez, Retaining Race, supra note 35, at 281; see also L. LUCA
CAVALLI-SFORZA ET AL., THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF HUMAN GENES (1994) (discussing the
lack of biological basis for racial categories); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s (1986); Ian F. Haney Lopez,
The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
53. See Berta Esperanza Hemrndez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, Confused
Constructs and Reality Checks, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 199, 207 (1997) (suggesting imposed
social constructs are dynamic and tend to change based on the racialized, gendered frame of
reference of the actor).
54. See Substantive Program Outline, supra note 8.
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working within the context of the panel, challenges the single-race
construct of Latin America, to remind us all of the strong but marginalized
indigenous element in the Americas.
B. Plenary Panel I: Implications of Indigenous Activism
Susan Scafidi, who participated in Plenary Panel One:55 Implications
of Indigenous Activism, 6 argues that the legal construction of indigenous
55. Generally, the plenaries were intended to:
[R]eflect a delicate balance between the need to revisit issues of fundamental and
continuing importance to our multiply diverse communities and the need to chart
new directions, center particular struggles and integrate new issues and
perspectives into evolving LatCrit social justice agendas. Both are crucially
important in deepening the theoretical insights and expanding the solidaristic
commitments already achieved through the collective discourse and community-
building efforts of prior LatCrit conferences.
Id.
56. The plenary was described in the Substantive Program Outline as follows:
In our theorizing about identity, U.S. Latinos/as have focused on naming and
analyzing the superordinant practices of White culture and examining relations
among ourselves... as well as our relations to and with other subordinated groups
within the U.S .... As LatCrits, we are just now exploring the political and
economic benefits of a pan-ethnic Latina/o identity while learning of the complex
experiences that both connect and divide the different populations that fit within
the Latina/o umbrella.
The rest of the continent is witnessing seismic changes in the struggles
associated with ethnic identities. . . . At least eight Latin American
nations-Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and
Paraguay-now recognize the ethnic pluralism of their societies by including
specific constitutional provisions granting varying degrees of autonomy to the
indigenous groups within the national borders ....
This identity, asserted by indigenous peoples, is as distinct from the mestizo/a
majority as it is from the criollo/a minority (i.e., the White European elites) ....
What does this hemispheric dialogue and struggle mean for U.S. Latinas/os?
How is the Latina/o struggle for voice, vote, and power in the U.S. understood
south of our borders? What does this struggle mean for LatCrit theory and
practices? What can we learn when such concepts as mestizaje and hybridity are
challenged and then revived by Latin American theorists ... ? Latin American
theorists, . . . are drawing on concepts such as performativity, mimicry, and
national myths to deepen the understanding of the construction of national
identities in Latin America. LatCrit theory can be strengthened and broadened by
exploring its links to this new theorizing about the identities that define the
various groups in Latinas'/os' countries of origin and that also define ethnicity as
a concept and by extension give the "Lat" in LatCrit more specific meanings.
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peoples in the former Spanish Americas, mostly influenced by Juan de
Sol6rzano Pereira,57 is flawed because the European-Spanish legal culture
in which the original rules developed was markedly different from the
colonial Spanish-Indigenous culture imposed in the Americas. Moreover,
the difference between the more "homogeneous" Spanish culture in the
Iberian peninsula and the more racially and culturally diverse Spanish-
Indigenous culture(s) in the Americas, is one of the reasons for the
continued subordination of the Latin-American indigenous peoples.
Scafidi correctly diagnoses the result: the legal construction of"indians"58
in the Americas that was imposed by the Spanish conquistadores
(conquerors) was flawed and has left the indigenous peoples as a
permanent underclass in the new nations of the Americas. Scafidi argues
that the subordination of the indigenous peoples is the product of a failure
to adapt Spanish laws, which were developed in the context of a relatively
homogeneous Spain in the 17th century, to the more complex social
realities of the Americas. Scafidi's analysis suggests that the development
of the Leyes de las Indias (the Laws of the Indies, the Spanish Americas)
was a legal blunder-a failed comparative experiment-rather than an
affirmative attempt legally to control the indigenous peoples.
However, rather than failing properly to analogize, perhaps Sol6rzano
achieved exactly what he set out to do: to justify, through law, the colonial
occupation of the Americas and the subordination of the indigenous
peoples to the Spanish colonizers. The indigenous peoples are still
subordinated because one mostly White, Spanish-speaking, Christian
postcolonial dominant group has replaced a White, Spanish-speaking,
Christian colonial dominant group. Now, like then, the "White" (male)
elite also benefits from continuing the subordination of the indigenous
peoples. Therefore, the reason for the continued subordination of the
indigenous peoples is not some fundamental failure of analogy or
comparative methodology to bridge the cultural gap between Spanish and
colonial cultures.5 9 The real problem is that Spanish Leyes de las Indias
57. Susan Scafidi, Old Law in the New World: Solrzano and the Analogical Construction
of Legal Identity, 55 FLA. L. REV. 191 (2003) (indicating that her "essay examines the efforts of
seventeenth-century Spanish jurist Juan de Sol6rzano Pereira to clarify Native American legal
identity within the Spanish social order through the use of legal analogy").
58. Both generally and in law, Spanish conquistadores referred to the new colonies of the
Americas as the "Indias" (Indies) and to the indigenous inhabitants thereof as Indios (Indians). See
IV DITCCIONARIO ENCICLOPtDICODE DEREcHoUsuAL 389 (1998) (explaining that use of Indias was
due to Columbus' error in mistaking the islands of the Caribbean and the Eastern coast of the
Americas with the Eastern coast of the Indian subcontinent); see also id. at 392 (noting that "Indio"
refers to indigenous peoples of what the Spanish called the Indies).
59. Most comparativists accept the necessity of "bridging the cultural gap" when doing any
transnational work. See, e.g., Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational
Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TUL. L. REV.
HeinOnline  -- 55 Fla. L. Rev.  19 2003
FLORIDA LAWREV[EW [Vol. 55
intentionally replicate the essentialized normativities of 13th century6°
Spanish society: moros (Moors, Muslims), Jews, and cristianos
(Christians).6 By focusing on the 17th century Spanish society in which
Sol6rzano performed his duties, Scafidi perhaps misses the real analogy
intended by Sol6rzano, between 13th century moros (Muslims) and Jews
in Spain on the one hand, and 17th century indias/os in the Americas, on
the other. Re/viewed in this manner, the conquistadores merely duplicated
the social hierarchies they had at "home" in Spain in their newly
443, 444-54, 508 (1989). Accordingly, the "cultural, social, political and economic systems" in
which the law must be applied ar essential when instructing a client on the "relevant
considerations" of international legal transactions. Id. This matter is discussed further below in Part
III, infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
60. The 13th century might make a better historical frame of reference because this is the
period during which the Parlidas, the most important "national" code in Spain and its colonies,
were produced, starting in 1265. It is also important to note that this is a period of the Reconquista,
the process through which the Catholic kingdoms defeated and expelled Muslims and Jews from
the Iberian Peninsula. II DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAIROLA 1743 (2001) (defining
"Reconquista," in upper case, as generally referring to "the recovery of the Spanish territory
invaded by the Muslims... the culmination of which was the taking of Granada in 1492" (author's
translation)).
61. The Cdigo de las Siete Partidas has been described as "a work generally known as a
medieval legal treatise and called 'the first extensive compilation of western secular law since
Justinian."' MARILYN STONE, MARRIAGE AND FRIENDSHIP IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN 1 (1990) (citing
Charles Sumner Lobingier, Introduction, in ALFONSO EL SABIO, LAS SIETE PARTIDAS vi (Samuel
Parsons Scott trans., 1931)). They were drafted under the patronage and probably the supervision
of King Alfonso X, El Sabio, of Spain during the thirteenth century. Id. at 1-22. Some experts
believe that the Partidas did not become effective law until the 1348 Ordenamiento de Alcald, see,
e.g., RENt DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 57 (3d ed. 1985), but others hold that they
"were being used extensively as a book of reference by royal judges before 1348." STONE, supra
at 10 (citing EVELYN S. PROCTER, ALFONSO X OF CASTILLE, PATRON OF LITERATURE AND
LEARNING 51 (Reprint 1980)).
Francisco Martinez Marina, author of a prominent essay about the history of
Spanish legislation, claimed that the large number of Partida manuscripts with
marginal notes in existence during the eras ofAlfonso X, Sancho IV, Fernando IV
and Alfonso XI suggests that the provisions of the Siete Partidas were discussed
in universities and debated by lawyers and judges prior to 1348.
Id. (citing Francisco Martinez Marina, Ensayo histdrico-crltico sobre la legislaci6n yprincipales
cuerpos legales de los reinos de Leony Castilla especialmente sobre el c6digo de las Siete Partidas
de don Alfonso el Sabio, in OBRAS ESCOoIDASDE DON FRANCISCO MARTINEZ MARINA 194(1966)).
There is strong historical evidence that the Spanish nobility objected to the Partidas because they
appeared to limit the nobility's power and importance, both during the reign of Alfonso X, and that
of Alfonso XI two generations later. Id. at 17. The noblemen appeared to regard some of the
objectionable rules as the product of non-Spanish thinking imported from the Paris and Bologna
schools. Id. This may account for the debate regarding their effective date.
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conquered territories, it is just that the haves are essentially the same, and
the have-nots are of slightly different shades and religions.
Nevertheless, regardless of the historical and social frame of reference,
Scafidi engages us in an important discussion about the legal construction
of the indigenous peoples of the Americas that was imposed by the
Spanish conquistadores.62 The "noble savages" Columbus encountered in
the Caribbean have collectively become known as the Taino people.63 The
"cannibals" that Columbus warned of were the island Caribs, who posed
the most consistent indigenous military challenge to Spanish control of the
Caribbean." To these, of course, one must add the large indigenous
cultures of the continental Americas who were conquered by the Spanish
because, unlike the Taino and Caribs, these cultures were not totally
exterminated during the process of conquest. They are thus the principle
objects of the laws that Scafidi studies.
She deftly points out how the Spanish political culture used juridical
concepts that had a long history within the Christian Spanish legal order
and, by analogy, developed a system to apply to the newly conquered
indigenous peoples of the Americas. 6' This system is based on the natural
inferiority of the colonized indigenous peoples relative to the White
Spanish conquistadores. However, it also reflects a paternalistic charity
towards these wretched wards" that is comparable to the medieval
Catholic Canon Law and its ratione personarum jurisdiction over
"wretched persons" and its "protection" of Jews.67 The seemingly
62. Scafidi, supra note 57.
63. Id. at 198.
64. "Columbus encountered Tainos throughout most of the West Indies.... A second
peripheral group, the Island-Caribs, lived on the islands from Guadeloupe southward, separating
the Tainos from South America." IRVING RoUSE, THE TAINOS: RISE & DECLINE OF THE PEOPLE
WHO GREETED COLUMBUS 5 (1992). The Caribs and the Spanish fought a type of "guerrilla" war
during the early 16th Century, with many raids on Puerto Rican soil, and military response from
the Spanish. FEDERICO RIBES ToVAR, A CHRONOLOGICAL HIsTORY OF PUERTO RICO 30-99 (1973).
By the end of the century, the Caribs were no longer raiding. Id. The Taino on the other hand, were
enslaved in the encomiendas, and by the 18th century, were almost completely gone. See infra note
68.
65. Scafidi, supra note 57, at 198.
66. Id.
67. In Catholic Canon Law, the church law and ecclesiastical court jurisdiction was divided
into
jurisdiction over certain kinds of persons (ratione personarum, "by reason of
persons") and jurisdiction over certain types of conduct or relationships (ratione
materiae, "by reason of subject matter"). The church claimed "personal
jurisdiction" over: (I) clergy and members of their households; (2) students; (3)
crusaders; (4)personae miserabiles ("wretched persons"), including poor people,
widows, and orphans; (5) Jews, in cases against Christians; and (6) travelers,
including merchants and sailors, when necessary for their peace and safety.
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"charitable" language of the laws masked a horrible reality. 6' Like all
social and legal constructs that are based on the alleged "natural"
superiority of one group over another, the Spanish colonial model has left
the personas nativas/os americanas/os (persons native to the Americas)
as a permanent underclass within the new nations of this hemisphere.
Scafidi indicates that Critical Legal theorists attack analogical
approaches to law69 because they are "incapable of yielding just results in
a heterogeneous society." She focuses on the legal construction of
Harold J. Berman. Law and Revolution: The Reformation of the Western Legal Tradition, in CIVIL
LAW TRADITION, supra note 17, at 298.
68. For example, the encomienda (to entrust) system was supposedly a benign process of
putting the indigenous persons of Puerto Rico to work and to educate them into Christianity. In
reality, it was brutal slavery. On December 20, 1503, Queen Isabella of Spain issued a Royal order
instructing the Governor of Puerto Rico to "compel and force the said Indians to associate with the
Christians of the island and to work on their buildings, and to gather and mine the gold and other
metals, and to till the fields and produce food for the Christian inhabitants and dwellers of the said
island." THE PUERTO RICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 18-19 (Kal Wagenheim & Olga Jimdnez
de Wageneim eds., 1994). The edict itself identified the problem that it was trying to resolve as
follows: "We are informed that because of the excessive liberty enjoyed by said Indians they avoid
contact... with the Spaniards to such an extent that they will not even work for wages, but wander
about idle, and cannot be had by the Christians to convert to the Holy Catholic Faith .... Id.
While the Tainos were ostensibly considered "free" men under the edict, the reality was that they
were enslaved. Id. at 19-22. By the 18th Century most of the Tainos native to Puerto Rico were
almost completely gone. PEDRO MALAVET-VEGA, HISTORIA DE LA CANCIN POPULAR EN PUERTO
RIco (1493-1898), at 96 (1992) (noting that in 1509, 60,000 Tainos were given into the
encomiendas; only 14,636 were left by 1515; 1,537 were left by 1530; by 1778, only 2,302 Tainos
were counted as living mostly in the central mountains of Puerto Rico).
69. For example, Trina Grillo and Stephanie Wildman have described "the dangers inherent
in... analogizing sex discrimination to race discrimination." See, e.g., Trina Grillo & Stephanie
M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance ofRace: The Implication ofMaking Comparisons Between
Racism andSexism (or Other-isms), in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 566 (Richard
Delgado ed., 1995). Grillo and Wildman explain that
comparing sexism to racism perpetuates patterns of racial domination by
marginalizing and obscuring the different roles that race plays in the lives of
people of color and of whites. The comparison minimizes the impact of racism,
rendering it an insignificant phenomenon--one of a laundry list of-isms or
oppressions that society must suffer.
Id.
70. Scafidi, supra note 57, at 202. This claim raises complex questions. As Grillo and
Wildman explain:
Given the problems that analogies create and perpetuate, should we ever use
them? Analogies can be helpful. They are part of legal discourse, as well as
common conversation. Consciousness raising may be the beginning of knowledge.
Starting with ourselves is important, and analogies may enable us to understand
(Vol. 55
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subordination for the indigenous peoples of the Americas.7 Scafidi's
project fits within the LatCrit enterprise and its goal of helping to
empower the marginalized. Like Scafidi, LatCrit seeks to identify the
continuing subordination of entire groups and classes in any country, but
most especially in the real or imagined Latina/o "homelands"'72 at the start
the oppression of another in a way we could not without making the comparison.
Instead of drawing false inferences of similarities from analogies, it is important
for whites to talk about white supremacy, rather than leaving all the work for
people of color. Questions remain regarding whether analogies to race can be
used, particularly in legal argument, without reinforcing racism/white supremacy.
There are no simple answers to this thorny problem. We will have to continue to
struggle with it, and accept that our progress will be slow and tentative.
Grillo & Wildman, supra note 69, at 570.
71. As discussed above, Scafidi argues that 17th century Spanish society was relatively
heterogeneous and that it was therefore an error to apply the laws of that heterogeneous society to
the multicultural Americas. Nevertheless, while the Spanish society of the 17th century was indeed
socially constructed as heterogeneous, after a long process of Reconquista and internal persecution,
the laws that Scafidi critiques had their origin in the diverse Iberian peninsula of the 13th century.
Therefore, I believe that she has chosen an example that does not support the claim that analogy
cannot produce adequate or progressive results in a heterogeneous society. Rather, Spanish colonial
laws are an example of the replication of privilege to marginalize the "other," with essentially the
same privileged group (White, Christians), and a different "other" (indigenous peoples). See Berta
Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, The Latindia and Mestizajes: Qf Cultures, Conquests, and
LatCritical Feminism, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 63, 77 (1999).
[In] New Spain (Mexico) where the Spanish were a white minority, Spanish
attitudes toward the Native population paralleled the Spanish xenophobic
expulsion of Jews and Arabs from Spain ....
[T]he Spaniards in Mexico (as well as in other places) established a complex
system of racial categorization that included the prohibition of public office
holders from having a "taint" of Indian, Arabic, or Jewish blood.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
72. The term "homeland" is loaded with positive and essentialized meanings, depending on
lens. Compare Pedro A. Malavet, The Accidental Crit II: Culture and the Looking Glass of Exile,
78 DENv.U. L. REv. 753, 763 (2002) ("For me, 'home' is Ponce, Puerto Rico. No matter how far
away from it I may go, my personal, professional and emotional travels always lead me back to
Ponce."); with Perea, Five Axioms, supra note 35, at 240 ("'National origin's' focus on ancestral
lands and traits outside the United States facilitates the attribution of foreignness to Latinos/as, our
'symbolic deportation' from within these borders. Thus we are removed from our full and
constitutive role in a plenary conception of American identity."). Robert Chang explains that
Latinas/os and Asian-Americans share the imposition of the essentialized normativities of nativists
who construct their fellow U.S. citizens of color as foreign. Chang, supra note 23, at 58. The
nativists then dream of the "return" of the "foreign" "other" to the imaginary homeland imposed
by the nativist, or at least that the "foreigner" never will realize full citizenship within the U.S.
"Where are you from," is quickly, albeit often impliedly, followed by "When are you going back?"
Id. (citation omitted). For discussion of cultural nationhood, see also infra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text.
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of the 21 st century. LatCrit thus seeks to understand how subordination,
such as that described by Scafidi, is accomplished, because that is a
necessary prerequisite for its antiessentialist mission. LatCrit Theory will
benefit from proper historical analysis of the legal construction of identity
perpetrated by the Spanish colonizers on the nations of Latin America
because such constructs have enduring influence on the identity of
Latinas/os even here in the United States." Moreover, because the process
of legal/social construction of subordination discussed by Scafidi is similar
to the social construction of race in the United States,74 this work also
offers us yet another perspective on how to tear down existing power
hegemonies that will be relevant to LatCrit praxis within the United States
borderlands.
C. The TWAIL/NAIL Concurrent Panel
Jorge Esquirol and Michael Wallace Gordon participated in the third
concurrent panel, titled TWAIL/NAIL:75 Latin American Legal Theory.76
73. For example, colonial racial hierarchies often become part of Latina/o identity and
constitute internalized oppression(s). See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 37, 52 and accompanying text.
75. Elizabeth Iglesias has defined TWAIL/NAIL: "Third World Approaches to International
Law" (TWAIL) and "New Approaches to International Law" (NAIL). Elizabeth Iglesias, Out of
the Shadow: Marking Intersections in and Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal
Scholarship and Latinao Critical Legal Theory, 40 B.C. L. REV. 349, 372 n.65 (1998).
76. The panel was described as follows:
The other two sets of concurrent sessions this year features [sic] four concurrent
panels each. Like the plenary panels, these concurrent sessions reflect the desire
for continued attention to matters of recurring significance and the effort to mark
new terrain for anti-subordination critique. The concurrent panels, as indicated
more fully in the attached Program Schedule, address issues ranging from
continuing LatCrit efforts to engage and incorporate critical perspectives on
international and comparative law, to explorations of the current day
consequences of Cubans' identities within and outside the patria, Puerto Rico's
colonized history, and the political economies of culture, desire and latinas'
bodies.
As in prior LatCrit conferences, both the concurrent panels and the concurrent
workshops are crucial and integral events that enable conference participants to
join in relatively intimate small-group settings to carry forward ideas from prior
LatCrit conferences, or from conversations begun in plenary sessions during the
conference, or to break new ground that may serve as points of programmatic
follow-up in future LatCrit conferences. We hope you will take advantage of, and
contribute to, the synergies that are so often produced by the blend of plenary and
concurrent programming and so clearly evident in the Symposium proceedings
that have resulted from these blends at prior LatCrit conferences.
Substantive Program Outline, supra note 8.
[Vol. 55
HeinOnline  -- 55 Fla. L. Rev.  24 2003
THE SIXTH ANNUAL IATCRIT CONFERENCE
Michael Gordon focuses on the many mis/conceptions about Latin
American legal culture among United States' legal practitioners and
academics. He correctly attributes these false constructs both to United
States legal/cultural imperialism and to a failure to apply real comparative
methodology. Because he is one of the preeminent comparativists in the
United States today," Gordon acts as an important intellectual bridge
between North and South America, especially between the United States
and the nations south of the Rio Grande.
In his all too brief remarks, Professor Gordon provides a series of
illustrations of the anglo-saxon, male, protestant, pro-common law
American vision of a peculiarly legal form of cultural imperialism that
displaced Spanish law from those parts of what are today the United
States, but were Spanish prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 78
However, Gordon provides a more optimistic view of the present and
hopefully the future, particularly in the area of Public International Law.
He specifically cites the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)' as reflecting a more pluralistic vision of law and legality that
77. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A
NUTSHELL (2000); RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN A
NUTSHELL (2000); RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK (1999); INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A READER
(Ralph H. Folsom ed., 1997); MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN
A NUTSHELL (1999) [hereinafter GLENDON ET AL., NUTSHELL]; MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON
LAW TRADITIONS (1994).
78. Michael Wallace Gordon, Legal Cultures of Latin America and the United States:
Conflict or Merger, 55 FLA. L. REV. 115 (2003). As a result of the Treaty, the U.S. acquired
"present-day Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and parts of Utah, Colorado and
Kansas." JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES, CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA 253 (2000); see also Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Between the
United States of America and the Mexican Republic, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, May 30, 1848,
U.S.-Mex., art. IX, 9 Stat. 922, 930 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]. On the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, see generally THE LEGACY OF THE MEXICAN AND SPANISH-AMERICAN WARS:
LEGAL, LITERARY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Gary D. Keller & Cordelia Candelaria eds.,
2000); RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A LEGACY OF
CONFLICT (1989); Symposium, Understanding the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on its 150th
Anniversary, 5 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1998). LatCrit scholar Guadalupe T. Luna has written
extensively about the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See, e.g., Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicanas/os,
"Liberty " And Roger B. Taney, 12U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33 (2000); Guadalupe T. Luna, "This
Land Belongs To Me: "Chicanas, Land Grant Adjudication, and the Treaty ofGuadalupe Hidalgo,
3 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 115 (1999); Guadalupe T. Luna, Beyond/Between Colors: On the
Complexities of Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo andDred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 691 (1999); Guadalupe T. Luna, En El Nombre De Dios Todo-Poderoso: The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo and Narrativos Legales, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 45 (1998).
79. On the Treaty, see generally RALPH FOLSOM ET AL., NAFTA: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
COURSEBOOK (2000); RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., HANDBOOK OF NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(1998).
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better respects the different legal systems of its member states: Mexico's
civil law system, Canada's partially hybrid common law/civil law
tradition, and the common law rules of the United States. Specifically, he
points out that the dispute-resolution provisions of the agreement adopt the
substantive legal rules and standards of review of each member state.8'
The NAFTA has been the subject of LatCrit discussion, not all of it
positive,"' but it is clearly an important area for LatCrit study.
Jorge Esquirol challenges the "Law and Development" scholarly view
of Latin America. 2 This law and development model has endured well
past the shelf-life of that discredited movement. Professor Esquirol refers
80. Gordon, supra note 78, at 118-19.
81. See, e.g., Josd E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade
Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 312 (1997) ("NAFTA
investment chapter [overly) reflects U.S. laws and perspectives."); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human
Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinaslos in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 361, 369-71 (1996) (critiquing the "labor accord portion of the NAFTA").
82. Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41
(2003). David Trubek has provided a thorough, critical analysis of law and development:
The law and development movement was a sort of export branch of Imperial legal
culture. In the 1960's American legal academics, encouraged by massive grants
from foundations and government agencies, turned to the study of the role of law
in Third World "development."...
The law and development movement took the value of modern law to be self
evident. "Modem law" usually meant the codes or new statutory enactments
which third world governments had imported from other, presumably more
advanced, nations. Usually, these codes or statutes set forth norms that had little
relation to everyday life in the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Law
and development scholars assumed that adoption and implementation of these
(often imported) modern laws marked development or progress. And they treated
as a "problem" the fact that social relations in Third World countries did not
conform to these newly enacted norms. This equation of legal standards with
progress, and the definition of non-compliance as a problem, led these scholars to
spend a considerable amount of time thinking about how we could develop a way
to measure--and thus increas--the "penetration" of so-called modem law.
Compressed in that single word are a whole set of assumptions and attitudes
that have come under attack. Critics have challenged the following assumptions:
that any body of law contains a single set of principles or rules whose impact can
be unproblematically measured; that law emanates from some central source and
then is implanted in society; that modem law (whatever that is) is normatively
desirable or historically inevitable; and, finally, that the social scientific task of
measuring "penetration" is a progressive task. It does not require much
sophisticated feminist analysis to see how the use of the term "penetration"
crystalized the hegemonizing, dominating, and patriarchal nature of imperial legal
culture in the 1960's.
David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short. Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement,
18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4,37-38 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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to developmentalism and developmentalists to describe, respectively, the
Law and Development scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s, and the United
States academics who produced it. 3 Comparativists in the United States,
and elsewhere, have long recognized many of the shortcomings of law and
development." Professor Esquirol thus engages us in a well-crafted, strong
discussion and critique of the legal form of cultural imperialism
perpetrated by the North upon the nations of Latin America.
Esquirol argues that the developmentalist view endures in the United
States' memory because it fits in with American stereotypes about
"corrupt" and, more generally, inferior Latin American cultures.8 5 This
essentialized view in turn affects how Americans' interact with Latin
America. Additionally, the construct is embraced by existing dominant
groups in Latin America who thus protect their privilege and continue to
subordinate their own people. This marginalization from outside and from
within, especially in and through law, serves only to perpetuate
essentialized normativities-even within a culture that to the North
American eye is an "other."
83. See generally Esquirol, supra note 82.
84. For a succinct, critical note on law and development, see CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra
note 17, at 36-37.
85. Elizabeth Iglesias has described this phenomenon:
By the term development discourse, I refer to a cluster of arguments and
representations that organize our understandings of the causes and cures of
Latina/o economic and political subordination around accounts linking
subordination to underdevelopment and underdevelopment to the persistence of
social practices, relations, and expectations that are represented as elements of
Latin (American] culture.
Iglesias, supra note 81, at 377-78.
86. Berta Esperanza Hemindez-Truyol explains the irony of using the term "American" to
refer only to citizens of the United States of America:
I use the designation United States for the United States of America. Many, if not
most or all of the other authors use the terms United States and America
interchangeably. I decided not to alter the authors' choice of language in that
regard. I do find it necessary to comment thereon, however, because I find it
ironic that in a book on imperialism the imperialistic practice of denominating the
United States as "America" remains normative. Indeed, America is much larger
than the U.S. alone; there is also Canada [and Mexico] in North America, and all
of Latin America and the Caribbean, (some locations commonly referred to as
Central America, some as South America).
Berta Esperanza Hermndez-Truyol, Introduction, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRrIcAL
ANTHOLOGY 15 n.5 (Berta Esperanza Hernfindez-Tmyol ed., 2002).
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A new paradigm is needed that promotes full-both legal and
economic--desarrollo (development). This paradigm should reject the
assumption of the irrelevance of the official legal system as a positive
element in the daily lives of the americanas/os (the people of the
Americas). To the contrary, the new approach should embrace the official
legal system as a catalyst for change that has the capacity to empower the
marginalized. Accordingly, the process of reform should not be designed
to bypass the local legal system and supplant it with a supranational
alternative; rather, the end-goal should be to allow formerly marginalized
peoples to participate fully in the national legal system. Reform, rather
than replace the national systems; advise and empower the citizens of
Latin American nations; do not presume to impose and thereby control
those systems and citizens.
Esquirol provides a critical defense of the legal cultures of the nations
of Latin America through a well-researched and thoughtful critique of the
law and development movement as well as its more contemporary cousin,
modem developmentalism. He articulates that both the shortcomings of
this movement and its demise are too often constructed in culturally
imperialistic ways that underestimate or totally ignore the strength and
nature of individual Latin American legal systems. 7 Yet, Esquirol does
not ignore the negative forces and existing hegemonies within Latin
American societies. Rather, he explains how these forces are an altogether
ignored element that led to the failure of law and development theory and
its attempted implementation as a single model for an entire continent.88
This provocative and powerful critique captures the theme of the
conference, and engages LatCrit in developing a theoretical blueprint to
empower the nations of the Americas, with a progressive approach to legal
reform and to law more generally. Esquirol captures the spirit and purpose
of LatCrit by reconceptualizing the law and society movement, and
removing it from the previously United States-centric, paternalistic view,
and placing it in the context of the diverse legal systems of the nations of
Latin America. The central theme of his critique is that by accepting the
"duality," the separation between the formal legal system and the so-called
informal social/legal sector,8 9 critical theorists are abandoning the field of
87. The plural is especially important because it is the national, that is, local identity of law
that Esquirol explains defines the individual legal systems of the Americas. Hence, he challenges
the homogenized notion that "Latin America" is a single territory or a single legal system. Esquirol,
supra note 82, at 43.
88. Id. at 80.
89. In a work referenced by Esquirol, Hemando de Soto describes "informality" as a formally
illegal process "designed to achieve such essentially legal objectives as building a house, providing
a service, or developing a business." HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD II (June Abbott trans., 1989). The "problem" that produces the
informal economy is the state, concludes de Soto: "We can say that informal activities burgeon
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formal law to the traditionalist, conservative power brokers that are
thought to control it. In so doing, progressives are giving up any chance
of effective legality, because informality-the conduct of trade outside the
official legal system- 'will not work as a long-term, predictable legal
system.9'
Esquirol articulates a solution, a progressive form of "legal
nationalism" that conceives of"formalism... as the autochthonous mode
of legal interpretation in the region."9 Here, Esquirol's work is
reminiscent of the debate in comparative law over the effect of "certainty"
as a positive legal principle in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.93
"Sophisticated dichotomists," according to Esquirol, breath new life into
the duality's construct of a dichotomy between the formal and informal
legal sectors in all the nations of Latin America by recognizing the
existence of the separation without neglecting the official legal system as
when the legal system imposes rules which exceed the socially accepted legal framework--does
not honor the expectations, choices, and preferences of those whom it does not admit within its
framework--and when the state does have sufficient coercive authority." Id. at 12. Accordingly,
there is a duality, a disjunction, between the formal legal system and the informal sector.
90. Hernando de Soto further explains the activities of the informal sector as follows:
The concept of informality used in this book is based on empirical
observations of the phenomenon itself. Individuals are not informal; their actions
and activities are. Nor do those who operate informally comprise a precise or
static sector of society: they live within a gray area which has a long frontier with
the legal world and in which individuals take refuge when the cost of obeying the
law outweighs the benefit. Only rarely does informality mean breaking all the
laws; most individuals disobey specific legal provisions ....
Id.
91. Esquirol presents LatCrit with a real challenge to its convictions. See generally Esquirol,
supra note 82. Progressive social and cultural consciousness are positive forces, but he questions
whether the theoretical paradigm makes it impossible for praxis to work. While not discounting the
dangers of legal pluralism in the hands of a repressive reactionary regime, Esquirol nonetheless
challenges progressives in and out of the Americas to re-engage with the official legal system and
formalist legal scholarship. Id. at 95. While the field is an inherently dangerous one, it is also the
only possible source of a long-term solution to the problems of informality in the nations of the
Americas. Id. Accepting informality is not the solution. Rather, we progressives must bridge the
gap between the formal legal system and the pluralistic legal cultures within the nation states of the
Americas. Id. at 96-97.
92. Id. at 107.
93. The long-held perception is that the formal use of certainty to oppose fascism allowed
Italian judges to become a force against the excesses of the Mussolini regime, whereas the
abandonment of it in Germany turned the German judiciary into a willing tool of Hitler's regime.
See CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra note 17, at 998-1004 (comparing the ability and willingness of
judges in Germany and Italy to resist their respective country's fascist dictatorships by using or
abandoning the principle of certainty in the law).
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part of any sensible solution.94 In other words, the duality is not a
necessary part of the legal cultures of Latin America, it is rather a problem
that prevents everyone within those cultures from working within an
effective, pluralistic formal legal system.
Esquirol thus challenges the notion that Latin American cultures are by
nature lawless or chaotic. His work, and the scholarship he studies,95 may
provide us with the tools for a paradigmatic shift96 in the discourse of Latin
American legal cultures. One that must seek to bridge the gap between
formal and informal rules, and create a single pluralistic legal culture
within each Latin American nation.97
Both Gordon and Esquirol urge LatCrit to engage the cultures of the
nations of Latin America from a position of knowledge. This requires real
94. Esquirol, supra note 82, at 108.
95. Esquirol specifically discusses the work of Hemando de Soto, which identifies a lack of
anarchy in the informal economy, that is, the informal sector is not a completely lawless sector, nor
is it without rules, it is rather a marginalized group that has found it necessary to bypass the formal
legal system. It is however important to note that laws, substantive legal rules, are part of both the
formal and the informal legal system. See generally DE SOTO, supra note 89.
96. Philosophical paradigm shifts can be analogized to a process of religious conversion
because they are fundamentally subjective processes.
[A] scientific revolution occurs when one paradigm is replaced by another.
Paradigm shifts cause scientists to view the world in new and different ways.
During scientific revolutions, then, scientists experience perceptual shifts.
According to Kuhn, the transition from one paradigm to another is a conversion
experience that cannot be compelled by logical argument.
George A. Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use ofNarrative in Law, 30 RUTGERS
L. REV. 683, 701 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Therefore, Professor Martinez concludes "[s]ince
racial divisions are founded in something other than reason-i.e., deeply held prejudices and
sentiments-perhaps it can only be undone by techniques, such as narrative, that do not depend on
reason." Id. at 705 (footnotes omitted). Or are those calling for paradigm shifts simply appealing
to common sense? See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 518-19 (1995).
My objective, therefore, was not to present the blueprint of a new order, but
merely to show that the collapse of the existing order or disorder-which Fourier
significantly called "subversive order"-does not entail barbarism at all. It means,
rather, an opportunity to reinvent a commitment to authentic emancipation, a
commitment, moreover, which, rather than being a product of enlightened
vanguardist thought, unfolds as sheer common sense.
Id.
97. See Esquirol, supra note 82. While concerned about "foreign modeled realism" Esquirol
acknowledges that it does provide voice to traditionally disenfranchised peoples within the formal
legal system. Id. at 113. The dangers are that the discourse will not be tailored to the local legal
culture and that the colonial crisis of self-confidence will endow foreign models with undue
discretion that will create remedies not really effective within the legal systems of Latin America.
(Vol. 53
HeinOnline  -- 55 Fla. L. Rev.  30 2003
THE SIfXH ANNUAL LA7ERIT CONFERENCE
comparative study, as Gordon particularly urges, and a non-essentialist
legal/political paradigm, as Esquirol writes. Gordon takes LatCrit to the
trade perspective on Public International Law, which is clearly an
important area for the exercise of LatCrit praxis. However, Esquirol
provides an important warning with his extensive and strong critique of
the law and development movement, and the enduring negative effects of
its inherent construction of the legal systems of Latin American nations,
as hopelessly de-linked from informal reality.9 His strong analysis of the
theoretical shortcomings of these theories will help to produce a new
paradigm, informed by LatCrit Theory, that will result in praxis to
empower the "informal" sector, rather than undermine the "formal" legal
systems of the Americas.
III. CONTINUING LATCRITICAL ENCOUNTERS WITH CULTURE IN
COMPARATIVE NORTH-SOUTH FRAMEWORKS
These new voices within LatCrit all had a common focus: Latin
American cultures-more precisely the legal and social construction of
cultures-and their relationship to legal theory and praxis. Because the
frame of reference of some of the authors and of members of the audience
cut across national borders, this is a comparative legal study of culture.
Comparative law is the study of law that is foreign to the observer;
thus, it requires a particular methodological/scientific approach." The
distinction between comparative methodology and comparative legal
science" will depend on the intended use of comparative study. For
98. LatCrit has in fact studied trade issues. See, e.g., supra note 81. See also Colloquium,
International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory, 28U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177(1996)
(noting that many of the articles in this colloquium focused on the intersection between human
rights and trade and development).
99. Accordingly,
Comparative Law is not a body of rules and principles. Primarily, it is a method,
a way of looking at legal problems, legal institutions, and entire legal systems. By
the use of that method it becomes possible to make observations, and to gain
insights, which would be denied to one who limits his study to the law of a single
country.
Neither the comparative method, nor the insights gained through its use, can
be said to constitute a body of binding norms, i.e. of "law" in the sense in which
we speak of "the law" of Torts or "the law" of Decedents' Estates. Strictly
speaking, therefore, the term Comparative Law is a misnomer. It would be more
appropriate to speak of Comparison of Laws and Legal Systems ....
RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW I (5th ed. 1988) (footnotes omitted).
100. To the French, for example, comparative law (droit comparg) "is not a branch of the law,
but very specifically a part of the science of law (science du droit)." JEAN-LUC AUBERT,
INTRODUCTION AU DROIT 55 (5th ed. 1992) (author's translation); see also DAVID & BRIERLEY,
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example, the practitioner of comparative legal science can assist persons
in other fields of the law to adopt the comparative method, either to avoid
the problems created by the misunderstanding of different legal cultures,
or to illuminate effective courses of action that are based on a real
understanding of those cultures. Comparative law is, in this context, an
effective and sophisticated system of legal translation and education,
because "[flaw, taken alone and considered only in its strict theory, would
give a false view of the way in which social relations, and the place therein
of law, really operate.""'' A comparative legal theorist looking across
national borders ought to provide a full understanding of the law and its
underlying theory in their proper practical context. '02 Analogously, LatCrit
is a jurisprudential school that seeks to illuminate legal praxis, and in this
particular conference it focused on the cultural context of law across
international boundaries. 103
The cultures of the nations of the Americas are the products of physical
and intellectual colonization,"° which requires LatCrit to further develop
supra note 61, at 2-3, 11-13.
101. DAVID& BRIERLEY, supra note 61, at 14.
102. Goebel, supra note 59, at 447-48. Professor Goebel notes that this is not a universally
accepted tenet, id. at 454, but concludes, in my opinion correctly, that this is an important, even
essential requirement for properly carrying out our professional duties to our clients. For a general
discussion of the importance of understanding a legal system in its proper context, see generally
DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 61; GLENDON ET AL., NUTSHELL, supra note 77; CIVIL LAW
TRADITION, supra note 17, at 113-115; JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK,
COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1978); SCHLESINOER ET AL., supra note 99, at 1; KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz,
I INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW: THE FRAMEWORK 68 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed., 1987).
103. LatCrit seeks to be heard by and to assist our colleagues from the South but, in seeking
to hear other voices, LatCrit is also enriched by learning to look at itself from a different frame of
reference. This is a process similar to a traditional comparativist turning the study of a foreign legal
system into a critical look at their own rules and procedures. The comparative method will give a
national scholar "a better understanding of his own law, assist in its improvement, and ... open['
the door to working with those in other countries in establishing uniform conflict or substantive
rules or at least their harmonisation." DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 61, at I 1- 12.
104. Homero Manzi put it as follows:
Nuestra pobre Amdrica, que comenzd a rezar cuando ya eran prehistoria los
viejos testamentos . . . cuando la historia estaba ilena de guerreros, el alma llena
de misticos, elpensamiento lleno defilsofos, ia belleza Ilena de artistas, y la
ciencia llena de sabios... Todo lo que cruzaba el mar era mejory, cuando no
teniamos salvacidn, apareci6 lo popular para salvarnos.
HCTOR GAGLIARDI, POR LAS CALLES DEL RECUERDO 5 (1970) (emphasis added). Author's
translation:
Our poor America (meaning the continents, not the one country), which started to
pray when the testaments where pre-history... when history was full of warriors,
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the paradox of the colonized: that the society that this process left behind
after the end of the colonial period is both for better and for worse, the
product of the mixture of people, cultures, and laws brought together by
the colonization process. Accordingly, postcolonial societies often fall
victim both to external cultural imperialism' 5 and to internalized
oppression."06 The former colonized peoples intellectually and culturally
colonize themselves and prey upon each other by adopting and
perpetuating the essentialized hierarchies of the former colonial power. As
a result of this process, the peoples themselves are the colonizers and the
colonized.
the soul full of mystics, thinking was full of philosophers, beauty was full of
artists, and science was full of wise men .... Everything that crossed the sea was
better and, just when we were beyond salvation, the popular [culture] appeared to
save us.
Id. I realize that this quote is told from an Eurocentric perspective that might be read to exclude the
Native American contribution, but the Native American is a crucial element in the Latin-American
popular cultures that distinguishes us from the conquistadores peninsulares (peninsulares is a
reference to persons born on the Iberian Peninsula).
105. Carla Freccero explains that:
Imperialism can [occur] on different levels and usually involves territorial
annexation, economic and political annexation, juridical (legal) annexation, and
ultimately ideological and cultural annexation; these latter are often referred to as
cultural imperialism . . .. [Clultural or mental decolonization [is] a
"literature/criticism that is participatory in the historical processes of hegemony
and resistance to domination rather than (only) formal and analytic." Collective
and concerted resistance to programmatic cultural imperialism thus comes to be
called "cultural" or "mental" decolonization.
CARLA FRECCERO, POPULAR CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION 68 (1999) (citations omitted).
106. The internalization of oppression occurs when a group that is oppressed by the normative
society replicates some forms of oppression to marginalize members of its own community along
lines of discrimination that parallel those of the normative group. For example, women might be
subordinated by the men within the group, and among African Americans, lighter skin hues are
considered more desirable. Oliva Espin explains the paradox of a group that is the object of
discrimination marginalizing members of its own community:
The prejudices and racism of the dominant society make the retrenchment into
tradition appearjustifiable. Conversely, the rigidities of tradition appear to justify
the racist or prejudicial treatment of the dominant society. These "two mountains"
reinforce and encourage each other. Moreover, the effects of racism and sexism
are not only felt as pressure from the outside; like all forms of oppression, they
become internalized ....
OLIVA W. ESPIN, WOMEN CROSSING BOUNDARIES: A PSYCHOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION AND
TRANSFORMATION OF SEXUALITY 8 (1999).
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In its Latin American variant, the best challenge to the process of self-
colonization is the development of the "popular," the home-grown forms
of culture in all its variations, including recognizing that the dominant
popular Latin American cultures co-exist with subordinated (mostly
indigenous) systems, thus re/creating patterns of colonialism. The Sixth
Annual LatCrit Conference, and the essays included in this cluster, are part
of the process of challenging existing power hegemonies by recognizing
the real and vibrant legal cultures of the nations of Latin America, albeit
from a critical perspective. Together, they adopt a philosophically
communitarian,°7 cultural studies" view of the term "culture," meaning
that
culture is a whole way of life (ideas, attitudes, languages,
practices, institutions, structures of power) and a whole range
of cultural practices: artistic forms, texts, canons,
architecture, mass-produced commodities, and so on. Culture
means the actual grounded terrain of practices,
representations, languages, and customs of any specific
historical society. Culture, in other words, means not only
"high culture," what we usually call art or literature, but also
the everyday practices, representations, and cultural
productions of people and of postindustrial societies.'°9
107. The communitarian concept of citizenship views the "citizen as a member of a
community." Herman Van Gunsteren, Four Conceptions of Citizenship, in THE CONDrrION OF
CITIZENSHIP 36, 41 (Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994). "This conception strongly emphasizes that
being a citizen means belonging to a historically developed community. Individuality is derived
from it and determined in terms of it." Id. Moreover, "identity and stability of character cannot be
realized without the support of a community of friends and like-minded kindred." Id.
108. Carla Freccero explains that the
term "cultural studies" covers a range of theoretical and political positions that use
a variety of methodologies, drawing on ethnography, anthropology, sociology,
literature, feminism, Marxism, history, film criticism, psychoanalysis, and
semiotics. Cultural studies is anthropological, but unlike anthropology, it begins
with the study of postindustrial rather than preindustrial societies. It is like
humanism, but unlike traditional humanism it rejects the distinction between so-
called low culture and high culture and argues that all forms of culture need to be
studied in relation to a given social formation. It is thus interdisciplinary in its
approaches. Cultural studies "has grown out of efforts to understand what has
shaped post World War II societies and cultures: industrialization, modernization,
urbanization, mass communication, commodification, imperialism, a global
economy."
FRECCERO, supra note 105, at 14 (footnotes omitted).
109. Id. at 13.
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LatCrit encourages the development of the concept of cultural nationhood
or citizenship to differentiate the colonized peoples from their colonial
oppressors"' because it can be used as a source of empowerment,
consciousness, and pride."' But, this cultural exploration might produce
legitimate concerns over the dangers of nationalism" 2 and cultural
imperialism. Accordingly, LatCrit Theory illuminates the proper balance
between identifying cultural faultlines that require reform, and the
imposition of cultural imperialism that seeks a homogenized normativity
that only perpetuates the supremacies promoted by the colonial power.
As all the essays in this cluster indicate, the post-colonial cultures of
the Americas are the result of the racial, gender, and political mix created
by the colonizer." 3 The Spaniards effectively designed the blueprint for
the gender, cultural, religious, ethnic, and racial mix in the Spanish
Americas by conquering and destroying the indigenous peoples, raping the
indigenous women," 4 bringing in settlers, allowing immigration, and
importing African slaves. The Spanish then used law to define and
organize their practically constructed local societies.
LatCrit takes a critical look at those cultures and recognizes and
celebrates their strengths. But it also criticizes their shortcomings and
provides the theoretical vision to resolve them. Thus, LatCrit, as a premier
110. See, e.g.. Malavet, supra note 39 (explaining that the Puerto Ricans are culturally distinct
from the normative U.S. society).
111. Hence, "othering" can be used as a subversive force that empowers marginalized colonial
peoples. See Addis, ETHNICITY, supra note 42, at 127.
112. In speaking of the dangers of nationalism, Ronald Beiner ponders "[ejither fascism is a
uniquely evil expression of an otherwise benign human need for belonging; or there is a kind of
latent fascism implicit in any impulse towards group belonging." Ronald Beiner, Introduction, in
THEORIZING CITIZENsHIP, supra note 47, at 19.
113. Adeno Addis, in arguing against secession, identifies the need for co-existence: "Whether
the multiplicity is the 'unintended' consequence of colonialism or the organizing principle, the
defining feature, of the particular nation-state, the uncontroverted fact is that most nations are
indeed multiethnic and multicultural." Addis, supra note I 1, at 113.
114. I am not entirely comfortable with the use of the term "rape" here. As Margaret Montoya
explains: "Choosing the right word [to describe 'sexual relations between the Spanish
conquistadores and the indigenous women of the Americas'] is difficult...; perhaps rape is the
accurate term, but it denies agency to all the indigenous women in the past who were involved in
cross-racial relations." Margaret E. Montoya, Academic Mestizaje: Re/Producing Clinical Teaching
and Re/Framing Wills As Latina Praxis, 2 HARV. LATrNO L. REv. 349,351 n.3 (1997). The concept
of "agency" implies that people can be the objects of action or its subjects, the performers of acts,
i.e., the agents of action. When one is a subject, one acts as an agent for some purpose, hence, one
is exercising agency. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION xi (1997). When a person lacks the
power/capacity to take action, s/he is deprived of agency.
115. For descriptions of the process of construction of the Spanish colonial cultures in the
Americas, see Hernfindez-Truyol, supra note 71, at 76-79 (providing a general description with
specific examples regarding Mexico and Cuba); Malavet, supra note 39, at 12-20,55-74 (describing
the development of Puerto Rican culture).
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example of the current deconstructionist postmodern age, rejects the idea
of liberal universalism as being "merely a cover for an imperialistic
particularism."" 6 Postmodernism also points out the theoretical
shortcomings of current philosophical movements, and warns against the
mistakes of extremism at any end of the philosophical spectrum." 7 This
is especially true when one in engages in cultural studies, particularly
legal/comparative cultural studies, such as those included in this
Symposium.
LatCrit contends that the peoples of Latin America must be able to
develop "shared identities" 's within their own community as political and
cultural citizens of their respective republics --or within the United States
community that is most familiar to LatCritters-as political citizens of the
nation who have their culture respected by the normative society. The
alternative, to construct any people as cultural "citizen[s] of the world,"' "
116. Beiner, supra note 112, at 9. "Appeals to universal reason typically serve to silence,
stigmatize and marginalize groups and identities that lie beyond the boundaries of a white, male,
Eurocentric hegemon. Universalism is merely the cover for an imperialistic particularism." Id.
117' Beiner, for example, describes what he calls the "universalism/ particularism
conundrum," as: "[t]o opt wholeheartedly for universalism implies deracination-rootlessness. To
opt wholeheartedly for particularism implies parochialism, exclusivity, and narrow-minded closure
of horizons." Id. at 12.
118. Addis explains:
By "shared identity" I mean to refer to an identity that bonds together, partially
and contingently, minorities and majorities, such that different cultural and ethnic
groups are seen, and see themselves, as networks of communication where each
group comes to understand its distinctiveness as well as the fact that
distinctiveness is to a large degree defined in terms of its relationship with the
Other. Viewed in this way, the notion of shared identity is not a final state of
harmony, as communitarians would claim. It is rather a process that would allow
diverse groups to link each other in a continuous dialogue with the possibility that
the life of each group will illuminate the conditions of others such that in the
process the groups might develop, however provisionally and contingently,
"common vocabularies of emancipation," and ofjustice. I think Seyla Benhabib
is right when she observed that "[tihe feelings of friendship and solidarity
result... through the extension of our moral and political imagination... through
the actual confrontation in public life with the point of view of those who are
otherwise strangers to us but who become known to us through their public
presence as voices and perspectives we have to take into account."
Addis, supra note I 1l, at 127 (footnotes omitted).
119. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM
5 (1996). Nussbaum advocates cosmopolitan citizenship thusly:
The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might
have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, [Diogenes'] Stoic successors held,
we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or
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would constitute an imposed homogeneity. Critical scholars should reject
the notion that being Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Columbian, Chilean
(or American, or Irish) first and a citizen of the World second is morally
questionable or irrelevant. 20 Nationalism, or as the authors discuss,
national consciousness and sensibility, may be deployed as a positive
force,' 2' as long as it is limited by a pluralistic communitarian
consciousness.'2 In this context, the peoples of the Americas should be
able to choose to be patriots of their chosen nation, 23 more generally,
even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should
recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients,
reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.
Id. at 7.
120.
Once someone has said, I am an Indian first, a citizen of the world second, once
he or she has made that morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally
irrelevant characteristic, then what, indeed, will stop that person from saying, as
Tagore's characters so quickly learn to say, I am a Hindu first, and an Indian
second, or I am an upper-caste landlord first, and a Hindu second? Only the
cosmopolitan stance of the landlord Nikhil-so boringly flat in the eyes of his
young wife Bimala and his passionate nationalist friend Sandip--has the promise
of transcending these divisions, because only this stance asks us to give our first
allegiance to what is morally good-and that which, being good, I can commend
as such to all human beings.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added) (referring to THE HOME AND THE WORLD, a novel by Tagore).
121. Michael Walzer describes this type of nationalism:
The quality of nationalism is also determined within civil society, where national
groups coexist and overlap with families and religious communities (two social
formations largely neglected in modernist answers to the question about the good
life) and where nationalism is expressed in schools and movements, organizations
for mutual aid, cultural and historical societies. It is because groups like these are
entangled with other groups, similar in kind but different in aim, that civil society
holds out the hope of a domesticated nationalism. In states dominated by a single
nation, the multiplicity of the groups pluralizes nationalist politics and culture; in
states with more than one nation, the density of the networks prevents radical
polarization.
Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP, supra note 47, at 153,
166.
122. In other words, nationalism does not have to be inherently fascist. See supra note 112.
123.
Richard Rorty urges Americans, especially the American left, not to disdain
patriotism as a value, and indeed to give central importance to "the emotions of
national pride" and "a sense of shared national identity." Rorty argues that we
cannot even criticize ourselves well unless we also "rejoice" in our American
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peoples of the world should be able to choose a national affiliation. While
nationalism cannot become dogma,12 4 cultural sovereignty within a
supranational political culture that empowers the marginalized 2 1 would
allow the nations of Latin America-and the Estados Unidos de
Norteamirica (the United States of America)-to live up to the ideal of a
diverse "political culture" that exercises "constitutional patriotism.' 26
IV. CONCLUSION: BIENVENIDAs/os, AMIGAS/OS AMERICANAS/OS
LatCrit VI, and this issue, have brought to the forefront new voices in
legal scholarship. This is part of the process of resisting the suppression
of scholars of color within the United States legal academy. 2 7 But it is
more importantly about expanding the LatCritical exploration of law,
theory, and praxis within a newly-enriched United States legal scholarship.
The essays in this cluster are a major contribution to creating a link
between the existing LatCrit emancipatory theory and praxis, and the
existing and developing academic environment in North and South
America.
This part of the Symposium issue presents new voices and new
discourses that develop, expand, transform, and enrich LatCrit Theory.
These essays collectively provide an important lens to re/view the
multicultural and multiracial Latin American societies, and thus to
challenge the inherited racialized constructs of the nations of the world
generally, and those of Latin America in particular. The fundamental
paradigmatic shift that brings all the authors together is the denial of the
identity and define ourselves fundamentally in terms of that identity. Rorty seems
to hold that the primary alternative to a politics based on patriotism and national
identity is what he calls a "politics of difference," one based on internal divisions
among America's ethnic, racial, religious, and other subgroups. He nowhere
considers the possibility of a more international basis for political emotion and
concern.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 119, at 4.
124. J.G.A. Pocock uses the French Revolution as an example to describe the terrifying results
of citizenship becoming dogma which justifies the destruction of your "enemies," that is, outsiders.
The French revolution went from an uprising of citizens against the ancien regime, to the terror of
citizenship being deployed to justify the destruction of the enemy. Virtue became terror. See J.G.A.
Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times, in THEoRIzIo CITIZENSHIP, supra note
47, at 29, 50.
125. See Jflrgen Habermas, supra note 47, at 264.
126. Id.
127. To do otherwise, of course, would again create the incongruity identified by Richard
Delgado in the Imperial Scholar that the civil rights discourse in legal scholarship is being
dominated by the normative voices of White males and, thus, is fundamentally incomplete. See
Richard Delgado, Comment, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984).
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colonial myth of a single mixed race for Latinas/os, by pointing out that
those constructs in fact create internalized oppressions that deprive the
same marginalized persons, especially dark-skinned African descendants
and indigenous peoples, of voice within the national discourse (as
emphasized particularly by the work of Hugo Rojas and Susan Scafidi).
Additionally, as Garcia-Villegas, Gordon, and Esquirol point out, serious
analysis of, and engagement with, the national legal systems of the
Americas is essential to the success of any movement that wishes to
empower the americanas/os.
LatCrit theory and praxis were well served by the oral presentations
made by these authors at LatCrit VI, and the growing permanent record of
LatCrit scholarship, memorialized in this Symposium issue, is enriched by
it. iBienvenidas/os!
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